The CPRA applies equally throughout Australia and automatically overrides any state or territorial laws or regulations which are inconsistent with the CPRA.

The CPRA amended the competitive conduct rules of the Trade Practices Act (TPA) and extended its coverage to state and local businesses. CPRA created a new part IIIA of the TPA to provide access to significant national infrastructure resources. The exact interpretation of degree of accessibility appears still undecided. The Prices Surveillance Act was amended to extend price oversight to state and territorially owned businesses. Two new oversight entities were created, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the National Competition Council (NCC). The ACCC was created by merging the functions of the Trade Practices Commission and the Prices Surveillance Authority. The NCC was created as a pro-competition oversight body to monitor and assess NCP progress.

Another significant part of the 1995 CPRA was that the shield of the crown was removed. In forming the Commonwealth of Australia as a constitutional monarchy in 1901, the states had retained contol over certain economic functions such as electricity, gas, water, rail, road, ports, etc. Other economic activities, such as telephones and airports, came under Federal government jurisdiction. The shield of the crown doctrine immunized government entities from antitrust legislation.

Some economic activities fell under Federal jurisdiction by default, because they were new, unknown, or undeveloped technologies at the time of federation. In 1937 the states agreed to pass uniform laws to legalize Commonwealth regulation of air navigation regulations, following a failed attempt at a constitution referendum. This 1937 legislative agreement was not completely dissimilar from the COAG agreements that led to the 1995 NCP. COAG meetings are similar to meetings of US governors, but agreements at COAG meetings appear to set the stage for federal legislation that will not be rejected by later judicial challenges on constitutional grounds.

Since Australia had relied heavily on direct government investment from early colonial days, nearly all major infrastructure activities were closed government monopolies, in the form of departments, boards, etc. State and federal governmental agencies provided goods and services and often produced the (vertical) inputs required for such activities. Thus, a characteristic of these state owned monopolies was their vertical integration.

A former government entity that has been corporatized may remain under government ownership or be privatized. There are non-profit corporations in the NCP structure such as the National Electric Market Management Company (NEMMCO) and the National Electric Code Administrator (NECA), created to ensure the operation of the National Electric Market (NEM), which will allow all customers to choose their electric supplier by 2001.

Corporatization is a necessary but not sufficient condition of NCP implementation. To effectively implement NCP it has been necessary to disaggregate the vertical functions of the state entities into separate businesses and create a level playing field for the private sector to compete against recently corporatized government entities. For example, state electric systems, that formerly provided generation, transmission, and distribution have been and are being broken up into corporatized entities providing these services on separate functional bases. Often the same function, for example electrical generation, has been subdivided into a number of corporate entities that can compete against each other.

In effect, the vertical components have been dismembered and recreated as separate discrete business entities. The NCP approach could be envisioned as a vertical pillar being dissected and the separate parts being laid horizontal on a level field. Each of these formerly interrelated parts theoretically represents an autonomous, competitive business entity.

Victoria's corporatized entities providing electrical generation, transmission, and distribution have largely been privatized. The New South Wales (NSW) government recently attempted to privatize its electric system. However, the ruling Labor Party administration encountered strong rank-and-file opposition and was forced to back off on its proposed sale to the private sector.

The question of asset valuation is a major concern. In Australia, this problem is exacerbated by the limited taxing powers of the various states. Many privatization opponents in NSW argued that the electricity revenues acted as surrogate tax revenue, and as such gave the state a degree of financial independence from the Commonwealth.

Clearly, there are disparate views as to what the net future benefits will be and what discount rate should be imputed to set a capitalized asset valuation for a corporatized government entity. The capital value problem is illustrated by a perpetual annuity. If a perpetual annuity yields $10/annum, its value may simply be calculated by dividing the numerator by the discount rate. If the discount rate is 10 percent, the value of this annuity is $100 (10/.10). Should the discount rate fall to 5 percent, the capitalized value of the annuity increases to $200 ($10/.05). In this situation, the only issue in the denominator. In selling off a public asset, such as an entire electric system, without a comparable market, there are nearly infinite variations on how members of the body politic perceive both the numerator and denominator.

All jurisdictions encompassed by COAG have enacted a Competition Code. Because the states and territories of Australia have limited taxing powers, the federal government has instituted a financial rewards system to encourage the various states and territories to implement competitive policies. Assessments of competitive progress to justify awards are made by the NCC. The first assessment was issued on June 30, 1997, when $A406 million was available for distribution to states and territories..